Economic Freedom and Foreign Direct Investment: How different are the MENA countries from the EU? by Caetano, José Martins & Caleiro, António Bento
 UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA  
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTO DE TRABALHO Nº 2009/02 
 
 
 
 
Economic Freedom and Foreign Direct Investment: 
How different are the MENA countries from the EU? 
 
 
José Caetano 
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia 
António Caleiro 
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA 
Largo dos Colegiais, 2 – 7000-803 Évora – Portugal 
Tel.: +351 266 740 894  Fax: +351 266 742 494 
www.decon.uevora.pt    wp.economia@uevora.pt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract/Resumo: 
The risk perceived by investors is crucial in the decision to invest, in particular when it concerns 
a foreign country. The investment risk associated is a multi-faceted element given that it reflects 
many aspects that are relevant to (foreign) investors, such as the level of transparency, 
corruption, rule of law, governance, etc. In this paper we consider the level of economic 
freedom, as provided by the “Heritage Foundation”, for the most recent years, in order to 
analyse how is this measure of risk related to the inward foreign direct investment performance 
index, as provided by the UNCTAD. Given the subjectivity of risk an appropriate methodology 
consists on using fuzzy logic clustering, which is applied in the paper in order to verify how 
different the MENA region is from the set of EU-member states. The results show that economic 
freedom and inward FDI are positively associated, in particular in the cluster of countries that 
present a higher economic freedom. Of particular interest is the result that some MENA 
countries belong to the same cluster of most of the EU-countries. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave/Keyword: Economic Freedom, European Union (EU) countries, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Fuzzy Clustering, Institutions, Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) countries. 
 
Classificação JEL/JEL Classification: C49, E22, F21. 
 
 1 
 
 
Economic Freedom and Foreign Direct Investment: 
How different are the MENA countries from the EU? 
 
 
José Caetano & António Caleiro 
(jcaetano@uevora.pt & caleiro@uevora.pt) 
Departamento de Economia 
Universidade de Évora 
Portugal 
 
January, 2009 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The risk perceived by investors is crucial in the decision to invest, in particular when it 
concerns a foreign country. The investment risk associated is a multi-faceted element 
given that it reflects many aspects that are relevant to (foreign) investors, such as the 
level of transparency, corruption, rule of law, governance, etc. In this paper we 
consider the level of economic freedom, as provided by the “Heritage Foundation”, for 
the most recent years, in order to analyse how is this measure of risk related to the 
inward foreign direct investment performance index, as provided by the UNCTAD. 
Given the subjectivity of risk an appropriate methodology consists on using fuzzy logic 
clustering, which is applied in the paper in order to verify how different the MENA 
region is from the set of EU-member states. The results show that economic freedom 
and inward FDI are positively associated, in particular in the cluster of countries that 
present a higher economic freedom. Of particular interest is the result that some MENA 
countries belong to the same cluster of most of the EU-countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the 1990s the literature has been paying more attention to the importance of the 
quality of institutions and of economic freedom for the countries economic 
development. Economic freedom means the degree to which a market economy is in 
place, where the central components are voluntary exchange, free competition, and 
protection of persons and property. O'Doriscoll et al. (2001: 43) define economic 
freedom as “the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, 
distribution or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for 
citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself”. In these terms, the economic freedom 
could be a key factor accounting for economic growth (Berggren, 2003). 
 
The incentives that economic actors face are determined in large part by the 
institutions in place, which can be more or less efficient. Furthermore, sustained high 
growth rates imply eventually great wealth, and so in the long term the economic 
freedom that increases growth can also be expected to increase wealth. Despite this 
fact, there are theoretical reasons to expect a positive relation between economic 
freedom and economic growth but does empirical evidence confirm this link?  
 
A number of studies have corroborated those expectations, with varying strengths and 
in different forms. For instance, Adkins et al. (2002) find that the level of economic 
freedom at the beginning of the growth period does not contribute significantly to 
explaining growth, but that positive changes in economic freedom do so. Yet, other 
studies conclude that the initial level of economic freedom is also positively related to 
growth (Weede and Kämpf, 2002). In any case, the issues included in economic 
freedom should be taking into account once policies try to promote economic 
development. 
 
Since the share of the developing countries in the global foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows has been rising1, there is also a growing interest in study the determinants 
of this kind of flows. In fact, the literature has accepted that FDI can provide additional 
resources for developing countries, by which they could improve their economic 
performance and factor productivity, through the diffusion of technological progress 
and the boost of domestic investment (Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007). 
                                          
1 From 1980 to 2004, the share of developing countries in the world FDI flows evolved by 25% to 44%, which 
means a significant evolution. However, data for 2007 displayed an erosion of this share for 27.3% 
(UNCTAD, 2008). 
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In this context some studies have analyzed the importance of economic freedom in the 
FDI performance in developing countries, especially in what concerns some aspects of a 
country’s trade policy, its banking and finance services and its property right protection 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Likewise, Gwartney et al. (2003) suggested that the 
key ingredients to economic freedom include freedom to compete, voluntary exchange, 
and protection of person and property. 
 
In order to uncover the factors that matters for foreign investment flows, it is 
necessary to distinguish the following types of investment: market seeking; resource 
seeking; efficiency seeking. Thus, the new wave of globalization has led to a 
reconfiguration of the ways in which multinationals pursue these various types of FDI, 
and changed the motives for investing abroad. Dunning (2002) sustain that the FDI in 
developing countries has been shifting from market and resource seeking investments, 
to more efficiency seeking investments. Some authors argue that the relative 
importance of the traditional market related factors (wage costs, infrastructure or 
macroeconomic policy) no longer hold and suggest that less traditional determinants 
have become more important, like institutions or economic freedom (Becchetti and 
Hasan, 2004).  
 
FDI flows to the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region have been relatively low when 
compared to the European Union (EU) and to other developing and emerging countries 
(Onyeiwu, 2008). Some characteristics of the MENA countries could entail an important 
constraint for the inward FDI performance. This region is highly anchored on oil, which 
weakens the economic base, has high unemployment rates, displays a weak regional 
economic integration and the capital and financial markets persist undeveloped. 
 
Yet, some countries in the region are witnessing a new era in privatization, bank 
regulation and market-oriented financial institutions, making the need to look at the 
role of other determinants even more pertinent. The analysis of MENA institutional 
systems that influence economic freedom appears to be attractive since a significant 
number of this countries is been experiencing institutional reforms. Moreover, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, along with the progressive elimination of trade 
barriers, has boosted trade relations and some countries have liberalized their 
investment regulatory framework, creating particular regimes for FDI. Taking into 
account these facts and the relatively scarce empirical research on FDI in MENA 
countries, we consider being important to study this subject.  
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There is a vast literature on the determinants of FDI and the empirical studies differ in 
terms of the variables, methodologies, the type of FDI and the countries included. In 
general, variables affecting the FDI flows can be classified into two categories: market-
oriented variables and institutional-oriented variables. In this study, our emphasis is 
the institutional-oriented variables, especially in the economic freedom issues.  
 
In this paper we use the Index of Economic Freedom, provided by the Heritage 
Foundation, for the most recent years, in order to analyse how is this measure related 
to the Inward Foreign Direct Investment Performance Index, as provided by the 
UNCTAD. Given the subjectivity of economic freedom, an appropriate methodology 
consists on using fuzzy logic clustering (Caetano and Caleiro, 2007), which is applied in 
the paper in order to verify how different is the MENA region from the set of EU-
member states. The aim is to investigate whether there are region-specific factors in 
the economic freedom that are significant for FDI performance. The accomplishment of 
this objective adds to the literature given the methodology that is applied in the paper. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the empirical 
literature linking economic freedom issues and inward FDI, emphasizing the research 
on the MENA countries. Section 3 comments some descriptive statistics on the 
economic freedom and foreign direct investment in the MENA region and in the EU 
members. Section 4 explains the methodological aspects related to the data and the 
fuzzy logic technique analyses how economic freedom exerts influence on the FDI. 
Given that a certain level of perceived economic freedom can, in fact, be subject to 
different subjective evaluations by investors, the paper uses a fuzzy logic approach in 
order to determine conceivable clusters in the space economic freedom-FDI, which is 
done in Section 5. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The literature is mainly dedicated to study the impact of the economic freedom on 
inward FDI flows. For a number of reasons, the transparency in economic policies is an 
essential issue for investors, especially for foreigners. The lack of these conditions 
imposes extra costs to the firms, linked to the lack of information about activities or 
even future intentions of some governmental departments. Thus, the selection of 
investment location is, sometimes, biased for the presence of non-economic elements. 
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So, a steady and actively legal framework against the corruption and promoting 
economic freedom can, in fact, represent a factor of attractiveness for FDI. 
 
The positive interaction between economic freedom and FDI atractiveness is due to, in 
the first place, the fact that free markets promote a better factor allocation and 
stimulate the productivity and the investments profitability. In the second place, since 
FDI involve significant sunk costs (particularly the greenfield), investments become 
very sensitive to the degree of stability and security offered by the legal protection 
system of the intellectual property rights. So, the existence of clear and predictable 
economic policies related to liberalizing regimes of investment and trade can be 
powerful instruments in the way to attract FDI flows (Drabek and Payne, 2001). 
 
The OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988) is a milestone reference in the theoretical and 
empirical approaches of the FDI. This paradigm sustains that firm decisions in relation 
to foreign markets depends on the economic and institutional conditions in home and 
host countries. In concrete, the decision to invest in a foreign country needs the firm 
boast, simultaneously, three types of advantages: ownership (O), location (L) and 
internalization (I). The ownership advantages reveal to be a basic condition for that the 
firm explore it in any market. Also, the choice of the location is conditional on the 
existence of structural market imperfections or from specific factor endowments, being 
mostly relevant the risk that firm incurs when dislocating to an unknown market. 
Finally, firms internalize their own markets of intermediate goods, whenever the costs 
of transaction in the markets surpass the coordination costs that the company supports 
for the internal accomplishment of this type of activities. 
 
Later, the new concept of “capitalism of alliances”, based in the mutual trust, 
commitments and the contractual obligations between partners, widens the original 
scope of the OLI Paradigm (Dunning, 1995). In this sense, reciprocal trust may be a 
key instrumental issue for the firms’ potential success. The inclusion of economic 
freedom issues turned to be considered in an explicit form, given its impacts on the 
confidence level of the agents (see Voyer and Beamish, 2004). This Paradigm has been 
important to understand the multinationals behaviour, its usefulness being able to be 
strengthened by the inclusion of the freedom and its impacts on FDI. In fact, this issue 
basically affects the location dimension and it motivates firms to reduce the degree of 
uncertainty associated with its entrance in a foreign market. 
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The linkages between FDI flows and political risk and institutions are explored by Busse 
and Carsten (2005) for a large sample of 83 developing countries, taking into account 
12 different indicators for the period 1984 to 2003. They found that the investment 
profile, internal and external conflict, ethnic tensions and democratic accountability are 
significant determinants of FDI flows. Across different econometric models, the relative 
magnitude of the coefficients for these political indicators are largest for government 
stability and law/order, suggesting that changes in these components are greatly 
relevant for investment decisions of multinationals. 
 
A more recent study is provided by Dumludag et al. (2007), who investigate the 
relationship between FDI flows and institutions in several emerging markets, employing 
a panel data approach from 1992 to 2004. The socio-political variables include juridical 
system, corruption, investment profile, government stability, economic, social and 
political risks. Those authors wrap up that institutional variables are important, 
particularly corruption, investment profile and government stability. 
 
Despite those approaches, the impact of institutional differences between the home 
and the host countries has been little researched so far. Yet, in a recent study, using a 
database provided by the French Ministry of Finance network in 52 countries and the 
Fraser Institute database, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) examine the role of institutions 
in the both host and source country by estimating a gravity equation for bilateral FDI 
stocks that includes governance indicators. The analysis provides abundant evidence to 
carry on the idea by which institutions do matter whatever the countries development 
level. In fact, results show that inward FDI is positively affected by public efficiency, 
which includes tax system, transparency and lack of corruption, security property rights 
and the easiness to create a business.  
 
In sum, literature recognizes the importance of institutional variables in empiric 
studies, providing support for the idea that an efficient legal and social framework 
promotes economic freedom and reduces uncertainties. So, most of the studies 
conclude that the protection of intellectual property rights, low corruption levels, 
enforcement mechanisms and political stability influences positively the FDI inward 
flows and the economic growth2. In fact, when these conditions do not exist in a 
                                          
2 Literature has also been paying attention to the relationship between economic freedom and corruption. 
Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) identify a stable pattern of aspects of economic freedom influencing corruption 
that differs depending on whether countries are rich or poor. So, despite there is a strong relation between 
economic freedom and corruption, this relation depends on a country’s level of development and, contrary to 
what is expectated, they find that some types of regulation reduce corruption. 
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country, foreign investors can face particularly high costs in establishing an operation 
and inhibit FDI inflows.  
 
Despite the lack of research on determinants of FDI in MENA countries, recent studies 
have analysed this issue by using different methodologies and data sets. All these 
studies share the idea that FDI for these countries is low when compared with other 
developing countries. In addition, most of them concentrate on the importance of the 
institutional issues for the FDI inflows in these countries, concluding that institutions 
are vital to explain the poor performance of the MENA region in attracting FDI.  
 
An early analysis is performed by Kamaly (2002), who uses a dynamic panel model for 
the period 1990 to 1999. In this study, economic growth and the lagged value of 
FDI/GDP were the only significant determinants of FDI flows to the MENA region. 
However, this approach, as are most other studies on FDI in developing countries, does 
not cover the recent period and uses a small sample, thus raising questions about the 
consistency and efficiency of the coefficients of the dynamic model. Also, it does not 
consider the institutional factors that affect FDI flows to the MENA region.  
 
By using a fixed effects panel data model for the period 1975 to 1999, Onyeiwu (2004) 
compares 10 MENA countries with other developing countries, including in the study 
institutional aspects that may affect FDI flows to the region. He concludes that 
corruption is, in general, significant for all the developing countries and, in the case of 
the MENA countries; it is the only significant variable in explaining FDI inflows. 
However, the author uses government expenditure over GDP as proxy for corruption, 
which might not be the appropriate measure for this variable. 
 
Chan and Gemayel (2004) study the relation between macroeconomic instability and 
FDI in the MENA region. They employ two dynamic panel data models using two 
groups: one with 19 MENA countries and the other with 14 EU countries as well as 
Canada and USA. Their results show that the instability has a much stronger impact on 
FDI than risk itself, being this particularly important for the MENA region. However, the 
study suffers from the weak consistency of the coefficients in the dynamic models, 
because the sample data is not large enough to be confident on the results and the 
applied estimation methods are not the appropriate ones for obtaining consistent 
estimates in a dynamic panel data model.  
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Other assessment on the influence of quality of institutions on trade and FDI in MENA 
countries is developed by Méon and Sekkat (2004), who includes data from 1990 to 
1999, covering a large number of countries, including some MENA countries. They use 
some proxies the quality of institutions, namely corruption, political risk and 
governance. The results show a significant relationship between political risk and 
inward FDI, but failed to find clear evidence of a significant relationship between 
corruption and FDI flows. In fact, they employ different indicators of corruption and 
conclude that the results are sensitive to the index used to measure corruption. In the 
same line, applying the Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance indexes, Daniele and 
Marani (2007) look into the role of the quality of institutions on FDI, through a cross 
sectional regression analysis for 129 countries to the period 1995-2004, concluding 
that institutions are crucial to explain the performances of countries in attracting FDI.  
 
Kobeissi (2005) performed a testing on the impact of some non-traditional factors on 
foreign investment in MENA countries, focusing on factors such as governance, legal 
environment, and economic freedom, based on the indicators provided by the Heritage 
Foundation. The results reveal a consistent support for the positive impact of 
governance, legal system and economic freedom on the FDI flows in the MENA region, 
but the governance showed the most significant results followed by legal system and 
then economic freedom. The relatively lower importance of the last two variables could 
be due to the fact that investors from different countries have varying degrees of 
tolerance for imperfections in the host country's investment environment.  
 
Ferragina and Pastore (2006) examines FDI flows from the EU to two neighbouring 
regions: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and South Mediterranean (MED) countries 
(including some MENA countries), to verify whether there was any diversion effect on 
FDI flows following the CEE integration in the EU. They use a gravity type model and a 
panel data approach to study the determinants of bilateral FDI flows for the period 
1994-2004. Among the explanatory variables are included some institutional and 
economic freedom issues. They conclude that there is no evidence of FDI diversion, but 
results also highlight that governance is highly significant with positive sign and the 
current and capital account restrictions are both negative and highly significant. 
 
Finally, in a fresh study, Onyeiwu (2008) uses a logit and cross-country regressions, for 
61 MENA and non-MENA countries, to examine whether scarce investment in 
knowledge, technology, and human capital by MENA countries explains their sub-
optimal FDI profile. Results from both models suggest that investment in knowledge 
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and technology is not significant for the MENA country’s ability to attract an optimal 
level of FDI. To the contrary, openness of the economy, GDP per capita and political 
risks are more important to attract this kind of flows. So, one implication for MENA 
countries is that, despite their poor science and technology infrastructure, they could 
still attract FDI by promoting openness and political rights and civil liberties.  
 
3. Discussion of the data  
 
Before presenting the methodological issues used in the paper we make a brief 
presentation of the variables included in that component and we will make an empirical 
analysis of trends observed over the period. In what concerns the FDI data, we use the 
inward FDI performance index provided by UNCTAD for the period 1999-2001 to 2004-
2006, which ranks countries by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It 
is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP, that is 
w
i
w
i
GDP
GDP
FDI
FDI
i
IND =
3. Thus, a value greater than 1 indicates that the country receives more 
FDI than its relative economic size, a value below 1 means that it receives less. The 
index thus captures the influence on FDI of factors other than market size, assuming 
that, other things being equal, economic size is the base line for attracting investment.  
 
In this study we apply the Index of Economic Freedom provided by Heritage Foundation 
for 162 countries, for measuring economic freedom, which included 50 independent 
variables which fall into 10 categories of economic freedom. Each country receives its 
overall economic freedom score based on the simple average of the 10 individual factor 
score. Each factor is graded according to a unique scale, which runs from 1 to 5, where 
a score of 1 indicates an economic environment that are most conducive to economic 
freedom and a score of 5 signifies the opposite. The 10 variables included in the overall 
index are the follows4: 
• Business freedom is the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise quickly 
and easily. Burdensome, redundant regulatory rules are the most harmful barriers 
to business freedom. 
• Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. 
                                          
3 Where INDi is the inward FDI performance index of the i-th country, FDIi is the FDI inflows in the i-th country, 
FDIw is the world FDI inflows, GDPi is the GDP in the i-th country and GDPw is the world GDP. 
4 For a detailed information, see the document Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic Freedom, disponível 
no site da Heritage Foundation 
 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/Index2008_Chap4.pdf  
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• Government size is defined to include all government expenditures, including 
consumption and transfers. Ideally, the state will provide only true public goods, 
with an absolute minimum of expenditure. 
• Investment freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital. This factor 
scrutinizes each country’s policies toward foreign investment, as well as its policies 
toward capital flows internally, in order to determine its overall investment climate. 
• Property rights are an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private 
property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
• Freedom from corruption is based on quantitative data that assess the perception of 
corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental legal, 
judicial, and administrative corruption. 
• Labour freedom is a composite measure of the ability of workers and businesses to 
interact without restriction by the state. 
• Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as independence from 
government control; state ownership of banks and other financial institutions such 
as insurer and capital markets is an inefficient burden, and political favouritism has 
no place in a free capital market. 
• Fiscal freedom is a measure of the burden of government from the revenue side 
and it includes both the tax burden in terms of the top tax rate on income and the 
overall amount of tax revenue as a portion of GDP. 
• Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of 
price controls, because both inflation and price controls distort market activity.  
 
Data on these variables are presented in annex and the brief analysis of its trends 
allows us to emphasize the following points:  
• Regarding the Inward FDI Performance Index we note that the EU presented an 
atractiveness clearly superior to the MENA region, with the average values in the 
range of 7 triennia because the EU almost double the figure recorded by MENA 
countries (2.12 and 1.23, respectively). However, when comparing the evolution 
between 1999-01 to 2005-07, the average value of that indicator for the MENA 
countries ore than quintupled (from 0.39 to 1.99), while for the EU growth was only 
9% (from 1.94 to 2.12). As a result of such trends over the last period (2005-07) 
the average values of the two groups were approximated, showing the two regions 
as very attractive in world terms of attracting FDI flows. 
 
• For the Index of Economic Freedom we found that the average of the period (1999-
05) in the EU was around 14% higher than the recorded value in the MENA region, 
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meaning that this gap has widened over that period, rising from 7.8% to 17.4% 
between 1999 and 2005, respectively. Although changes in the values for the two 
regions are not very significant in this period, we note that the average of the EU 
improved slightly (4.2%) and, in an opposite trend, worsened in the MENA region (-
1.1%). We also note that the performance of countries within each group was very 
different and, in particular in the MENA, the dispersion was very significant, 
indicating the existence of very different situations as far as promoting economic 
freedom. 
 
In summary, we believe that the dispersion found in the variables within the two 
groups over the period reflects a high diversity of countries performances in order to 
attract FDI flows and in promoting an economic freedom environment5. This is 
especially evident within the MENA countries where very different economic and 
institutional realities coexist. In fact, a number of countries in the region have paid 
special attention to making themselves investor-friendly by making the business 
environment more open and stepping up structural and institutional reforms, while 
others have been following other paths. 
 
4. The fuzzy logic approach 
 
Given that, we think the purposes of the paper will be mainly achieved by the use of 
fuzzy clustering techniques, it is informative to start with a general discussion of this 
kind of approach. 
 
Following the logic of crisp sets, the degree to which an element belongs to a set is 
either 1 or 0, by that meaning that the characteristic function discriminates 
respectively between members and non-members of the set in a crisp way. The 
generalisation to a fuzzy set is made by relaxing the strict separation between 
elements belonging or not to the set, allowing the degree of belonging/membership to 
take more than these two values, typically by allowing any value in the closed interval 
[0,1] (see, for instance, Zimmermann, 1991, or Chen, 1996). 
 
The values then assigned by the membership function of a fuzzy set to the elements in 
the set indicate the membership grade or degree of adherence of each element in the 
                                          
5 For example, some countries in the Persian Gufl (Bahrain and United Arab Emirates), Jordan and Lebanon 
have been revealing in recent years a high capacity to attract FDI flows. Interestingly, these countries, with 
the exception of Lebanon, are in the group that presents a higher position in relation to index of economic 
freedom. 
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set. Larger (smaller) values naturally indicate higher (lower) membership grades, 
degrees, or consistency between an element of the set and the full characteristics that 
the set describes. Hence, using fuzzy logic, one can deal with reasoning like: ‘the 
observed value for the economic freedom index, say 5, can be considered high, normal 
or low with some degrees of membership’. 
 
In terms of fuzzy logic, ‘high’, ‘normal’ or ‘low’ values (for the variable under question) 
can be considered to be subjective categories, as economic agents often evaluate those 
concepts differently. In what follows, it will be assumed that investors consider to be 
relevant their relative perception of economic freedom (in accordance to some 
subjective categories) for their willingness to invest, therefore assuming an 
approximate or qualitative reasoning. 
 
In the particular case of this paper, we will use this kind of fuzzy logic reasoning to 
construct clusters in the space (FDI, Economic Freedom). This partition of the space 
can also be done in, say, a traditional/crisp way. The crisp/hard clusters algorithm tries 
to locate clusters in a multi-dimensional data space, U, such that each point or 
observation is assigned in that space to a particular cluster in accordance to a given 
criterion. Considering c clusters, the hard cluster technique is then based on a c-
partition of the data space U into a family of clusters such that the set of clusters 
exhausts the whole universe, that a cluster can neither be empty nor contain all data 
samples, and that none of the clusters overlap. 
 
Formally, the hard c-means algorithm finds a centre in each cluster, minimising an 
objective function of a distance measure. The objective function depends on the 
(Euclidean) distances between data vectors uk (k = 1, 2,…, K) and cluster centres ci. 
The partitioned clusters are typically defined by a c × K binary characteristic matrix M, 
called the membership matrix, where each element mik is 1 if the kth data point uk 
belongs to cluster i, and 0 otherwise. Since a data point can only belong to one cluster, 
the membership matrix M has the properties: (i) the sum of each column is one, and 
(ii) the sum of all elements is K. 
 
 
The fuzzy c-means differs from hard c-means because it employs fuzzy partitioning, 
where a point can belong to several clusters with degrees of membership such that the 
membership matrix M is allowed to have elements in the range [0,1]. A point’s total 
membership to all clusters, however, must always be equal to unity. In this sense, and 
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despite that, in formal terms, none of the fuzzy clusters overlap, the fact is that, in 
general, each data point is assigned to every cluster, although with different degrees of 
membership. Generally speaking, in visual terms, each data point is then associated to 
the particular cluster to which its degree of membership is higher. 
 
 
5. How different are the MENA countries from the EU in terms of the 
relationship between Economic Freedom and FDI? 
 
In this section we analyse a possible influence of economic freedom on FDI. Figures 1 
and 2 plot the data and at the same time show the results from the fuzzy clustering 
technique.6 
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Figure 1: The results for 1999/2001 
 
                                          
6 The data can be consulted in the annex. The source of the economic freedom data is the Heritage Foundation 
(http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm) and the source of the FDI performance 
index is the UNCTAD (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2471&lang=1). 
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Figure 2: The results for 2005/2007 
 
Plainly, there are two well-defined clusters (identified in figures 1 and 2 by the dotted 
circles and empty circles, whose centres are given by the black crosses), one being 
associated with the higher level of perceived economic freedom countries and another 
associated with the lower level perceived economic freedom countries. In fact, the 
splitting of the countries clearly reflects the economic freedom values as it seems 
possible to separate the two groups of countries in accordance to a, say, critical level of 
perceived economic freedom around 52 for the first period under analysis and 61 in the 
second period under analysis.7 
 
Since the observed similarity between the results for the two periods, one can assert 
the robustness of the results. The results point to the fact that, in overall terms, there 
is a direct relationship between Economic Freedom and the Inward Performance of FDI. 
This relationship is apparently stronger in the cluster of countries with higher economic 
freedom. In fact, as the level of economic freedom is decisive in the clustering, the 
overall increase that could be observed in the economic freedom from 1999/2001 to 
2005/07 – which can be noted at the centre of the clusters in the two periods – led to a 
more homogeneous, from the point of view of the number of countries, clustering in 
                                          
7 This result makes it quite easy to identify the countries in each cluster (see the annex). 
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that last period. Consequently, whereas in the first period, 4 out of the 6 countries in 
cluster 1 were MENA countries, in the second period, 10 out of the 14 countries in 
cluster 1 were MENA countries, despite the general increase in economic freedom and 
FDI inward performance that these countries registered from 1999/2001 to 2005/07. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The results of the paper show that economic freedom and inward FDI are positively 
associated, in particular in the cluster of countries that present a higher economic 
freedom. Of particular interest is the result that some MENA countries belong to the 
same cluster of most of the EU-countries. 
 
To conclude we would like to stress the main lesson from our paper as a policy 
implication. In order not to be considered less attractive for foreign investors and, 
therefore, be penalised by that, countries do indeed benefit from increased levels of 
transparency in order to escape from the cluster of countries where perceived levels of 
economic freedom are smaller. In other words, policy makers should make sure that 
their policies are transparent enough for potential foreign investors. After escaping 
from that cluster, the objective of attracting higher levels of FDI has to be crucially 
obtained by the use of other measures. 
 
In the context of Dunning’s framework, we could understand the results of our 
empirical research as supporting the inclusion of economic freedom in the set of the 
relevant elements for the location tier (Dunning, 1988, 1995).  
 
Given that (perceived) economic freedom reflects a variety of factors – which are clear 
even in the way the economic freedom data is obtained – an interesting issue to be 
further explored is the analysis of the specific factors or components that assume a 
more significant role on the attraction of FDI. 
 
An analysis of the dynamics of the components of economic freedom or even of 
economic freedom itself seems to be a quite plausible improvement as the direction 
assumed by policy makers towards more transparent policies may have a marginal 
impact on the attraction of FDI much more evident than one may expect by the 
analysis of the absolute position of economic freedom. Straightforwardly, the more 
those measures are assumed to be credible by foreign investors, the more that can be 
the case.  
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Finally, we consider this paper as a promising starting point for the analysis of the 
factors that reveal to be essential for FDI, either in an inward perspective or in an 
outward perspective, both in performance and potential measures. The combination of 
all these perspectives, in a dynamic way, is to be considered in future studies. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of geographical factors, in what concerns the localization of 
the host countries and of investors, in those dynamics is also in our mind as relevant 
elements. 
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Annex: The data 
 
Country Economic Freedom 
score 
Inward performance FDI 
index 
  1999 2005 1999/2001 2005/2007 
Algeria 57.2 52.7 0.168 0.466 
Austria 64.0 67.5 0.362 1.706 
Bahrain 75.2 71.2 0.302 4.178 
Bulgaria 46.2 61.6 0.197 7.240 
Cyprus 67.8 71.9 0.254 3.022 
Czech Republic 69.7 64.9 0.259 2.169 
Denmark 68.1 75.3 0.394 1.176 
Egypt 58.0 56.4 0.184 2.948 
Estonia 73.8 75.1 0.262 4.869 
Finland 63.9 71.5 0.417 1.033 
France 59.1 61.2 0.403 1.659 
Germany 65.6 69.0 0.436 0.589 
Greece 61.0 58.5 0.280 0.341 
Hungary  59.6 63.2 0.258 1.991 
Iran 36.8 48.6 0.206 0.098 
Ireland 74.6 80.6 0.425 -0.353 
Israel 68.3 62.4 0.361 2.441 
Italy 61.6 64.9 0.342 0.624 
Jordan 67.4 65.7 0.260 5.758 
Kuwait 69.5 64.8 0.299 0.059 
Latvia 64.2 66.4 0.210 2.585 
Lebanon 59.1 58.0 0.209 4.386 
Libya 32.3 32.8 0.267 1.372 
Lithuania 61.5 70.5 0.203 1.838 
Malta 59.3 68.9 0.282 6.372 
Morocco 63.8 52.6 0.150 1.212 
Netherlands, The 63.6 72.3 0.434 2.689 
Oman 64.9 66.6 0.226 1.909 
Poland 59.6 58.8 0.249 1.587 
Portugal 65.6 62.9 0.286 1.241 
Qatar 62.0 63.5 0.407 0.571 
Romania 50.1 51.9 0.150 2.566 
Saudi Arabia 65.5 63.8 0.309 1.877 
Slovak Republic 54.2 65.6 0.232 1.903 
Slovenia 61.3 60.1 0.309 0.797 
Spain 65.1 67.7 0.349 0.996 
Sweden 64.2 69.5 0.429 1.604 
Syria 39.0 46.4 0.152 0.734 
Tunisia 61.1 54.8 0.180 2.157 
Turkey 59.2 51.6 0.155 1.117 
United Arab Emirates 71.5 65.5 0.392 2.498 
United Kingdom 76.2 79.3 0.472 2.661 
Yemen 43.3 52.9 0.158 0.821 
              Source: UNCTAD and Heritage Foundation 
